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of the States. And, indeed, as the reader will recollect, the
bulk of the opinion in Swift v. Tyson is dictum, and against
Mr. Justice CATRON recorded a vigorous dissent for the expressed reason that the point had never been raised by the
record, argued by counsel or even mentioned in connection
with the case until Mr. Justice STORY read his opinion.
One of the evil results of the trust fund explanation
is seen in the refusal in Handley v. Stutz, following
Sawyer v. Hoag, to permit one of the stockholders to set
off his own claim upon the corporation against the claim of
the creditors. This point is not noted by Mr. LEWIS in his
syllabus; it is of such importance that it deserves specific
mention. To this case Mr. LEWIs has added a valuable
annotation, containing a large collection of the authorities
upon the trust fund doctrine. Among them we notice a
case already referred to--Wood v. Dummer-cited as Ward
v. Dummer.
ir. LEwIS'S volume is, on the whole, well worth
attentive perusal, and to the lawyer with a brief to write it
will prove only less useful than to the student who desires
to keep abreast of the development of corporation law.

NOTES AND COMMENTS.
[The Editors are not responsible for the opinions expressed in this Department.]

THE HOMESTEAD RIOTS.
The recent disturbances at Homestead have excited
some little inquiry, as indicated by communications in the
public prints, as to the extent of an owner's right to repossess himself of his property by force without recourse to
law, where taken possession of and held with force and
threats by persons until then in his employ. Such right
undoubtedly existed at common law for a long period, and
extended to any disseisin by whomsoever effected. It was
termed the right of entry, and was founded on the necessities of the case, which might often require, in justice to
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the owner, a speedier remedy than the ordinary process of
law could afford.
"BIut this, "I says BLACKSTON-E; "being found very prejudicial to the peace, it was thought necessary by several
statutes to restrain all persons from the use of such violent
methods even of doing themselves justice," and accordingly
the statute of Richard II, C. 7. reads: "And also the King
defendeth that none from henceforth make any entry into
any lands and tenements, but in case where entry is given
by law, and in such case not with strong hand, nor with a
multitude of people, but only in a peaceable and easy
manner, and if any man from henceforth do the contrary
and thereof be duly convict, he shall be punished by imprisonment of his body, and thereof ransomed at the King's
will." The second statute of Edward III had already provided against the use of arms to strike terror into persons
against whom entry was made,* and other statutes followed
having a similar purpose, " so that," continues BLACKSTONE,
"the entry now allowed by law is a peaceable one; that
forbidden is such as is carried on and maintained with force,
violence and unusual weapons."
It appears that in addition to the prohibition of these
statutes a forcible entry against any one in possession was
indictable as a misdemeanor at common law, and the injury
was both of a civil and criminal nature, the civil being
remedied by immediate restitution, and the criminal by fine
and imprisonment.2 The common and English statute law
on the subject has been supplemented by statutes in the
various States of this country defining the offence and its
punishment. To constitute a forcible entry, it must be
with such force and violence as is sufficient to excite apprehension, as distinguished from a simple trespass, and accompanied by a claim to the land, and the party injfhred must
be in actual peaceable possession.
The reason underlying the law, as has been seen, is the
maintenance of the public peace. "The public peace,"
I Commentaries, Book IV, p. 148.
2

Commonwealth v. Toram, 2 Pars., 413.
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says BLACKSTONE,I "is superior to any one man's private

property, and if individuals were once allowed to use private
force as a remedy for private injuries, all social justice must
cease, the strong would give law to the weak, and every
man would revert to a state of nature; for these reasons it
is provided that this natural right of recaption shall never
be exerted where such exertion must occasion strife and
bodily contention or endanger the peace of society."
An exception, however, is recognized in the books
where an owner is forcibly deprived by his servants of the
possession of his property. His right in such case to use
force and "iolence in recapturing it, notwithstanding the
statute, was always recognized. The proposition is set
forth by HAwKixs, in his Pleas of the Crown, C. 28,
§ 32, p. 503, as follows: "That no one can be in danger of
those statutes by entering with force into a tenement
whereof he himself had sole and lawful possession both at
and before the time of such entry, as by breaking open the
door of his own dwelling or of a castle which is his own inheritance, but forcibly detained from him by one who
clims the bare custody of it, or by forcibly entering into
land in the possession of his lessee at will." Citing Moor,
786, HAWKINS, however, adds the words "sed quere"
after the statement, as though being somewhat doubtful
himself of its authority. BISHOP, in his work on Criminal
Law, however, adopts the proposition as stated by HAWKINS, 2 and it is expressly recognized in Pennsylvania by

Judge KING in the case of Commonwealth v. Keeper.'
Neither the instance cited by HAWKINS of simply
breaking open a door, nor the case ruled by Judge KING,

involved any injury to the person; but if the rule in all its
breadth be conceded, it may readily be imagined how the
liberty it allows may result in serious consequences. As
an exception to the inhibition imposed by the statutes
against a right which formerly had no limitations, it would
' Book III, p. 4.
'Bishop Crim. Law,
3 1 Ash., I46 (1828).
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seem to leave that right in the same position it occupied
before the statutes were passed, and might, stated in
another way, amount to this: that an owner, whose access
to his own property is forcibly or threateningly denied him
by his agent, servant or lessee at will, may use the same
force and violence in retaking it as if the positions were reversed and he were defending it from attack with violence
from outside. Certainly if he is deemed to be still in possession under such circumstances, he is defending his possession in either case. What then has one a right to do in
defending his possession?
Where a person is attacked in his own house he need
retreat no further; he may turn on and kill his assailant, if
this be apparently necessary to save his own life, nor is he
bound to escape in order to avoid his assailant.' Not only
is he excused from retreat when in his own house, but he
has the same excuse when pursued into any building out of
which he cannot escape without exposing himself to bodily
harm.' And when resistance to a felonious attempt is
concerned (i. e., burglary, or arson, or felonious assault on
the person), then the question of the ownership or the
purpose of the building does not come up. If such felony
is apparently attempted, and if it cannot be apparently
prevented except by the taking of life of the assailant, then
any person is justified in taking such life. Hence not
only the owner of the house, but his friends, neighbors and
a fortiori, his servants and guests may ann themselves for
the purpose.2
* And for similar reasons the protection of the law is
thrown over those who intervene to prevent an apparent
felonious attack on a church or bank.4
Now the reasoning upon which the owner's right to
retake by violence, under the circumstances stated by
HAWKINS is based, is not given in the books, though indeed
it must conflict with the general reason underlying the law
WHARTON

on Homicide, , 54 r , and see note to

meaning of the term "a man's house is his castle."
2 Id. . 550.
2 Id.

549.
Id. 551.
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against forcible entries, inasmuch as the one case might
involve as great a breach of the peace as the other.
the owner's posIt is said the serant's possession is.
session, and we may'readily concede that it is not necessary
in order to constitute possession that the owner should be
personally present on his property; and, further, that in
many cases as against third parties the possession of his
family, servants or agents is his own possession. But it
would seem to be a wide stretch of reasoning to conclude
from this that the servant's possession is the owner's possession even as against the owner himself, and when the
owner no longer acknowledges him as a servant.
Not less absurd would it be to derive the fiction of
possession in the owner, notwithstanding his forcible exclusion, from the constructive seisin in deed which was
recognized by the common law in the ancestor for the
purpose of inheritance by the heir in the absence of actual
entry,1 or by virtue of conveyance effected under the statute
of uses; or for the purpose of enabling an owner out of
physical possession to bring a real action, as, for instance,
where it was deemed to be an actual seisin for such purpose if a man having title of entry, but not daring to enter
through fear of bodily'harm, approached as near as he dare
and claimed the land as his own.* The object of entry and
its constructive equivalent in such cases is notoriety of
title, and such consideration does not enter into the case in
hand, as there can be no question here whose is the title,
and even if there were, the question of title does not enter
in the case of forcible entry.
But one possible reason would seem, therefore, to remain undisposed of, and that is the one above quoted
underlying the right of entry as 6riginAlly existing before
the statutes were passed, to wit, the "necessities of the
case which might often require in justice to the owner a
speedier remedy than the ordinary process of law," or, in
other words, as put by a learned judge, the protection to
one's home.
1 2 Kent, 385.
2 See Green v. Liter et al., 8 Cranch, 246.
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But it is submitted that the very circumstance which
would now in the absence of such exception subject the
owner to indictme nt for forcible enhl~y would likewise subject the servant to indictment for forcible dcliazei, and if
he might at once upon the first act of insubordination of
the character mentioned subject himself to arrest, the strong
ann of the law would afford a surer and speedier method
of giving the owner access to his property without occasioning a breach of the peace, than his own act.
"The same circumstances," says RUSSELL on Crimes, 1
which make an entry forcible will also make a detainer
forcible. And it hath been said that lie also shall come
under like construction who places men at a distance from
the house in order to assault any one who shall attempt to
make entry into it."
"If a man undertakes to retain what he knows to be
a wrongful possession by force or by numbers reassembling
exciting terror he is guilty of a forcible detainer." 2
The offence in Pennsylvania forms the subject of a
separate section of the Act of March 31, I86o, 3 which provides that "if any person shall by force and with strong
hand or by menaces or threats unlawfully hold and keep
possession of any lands or tenements, whether the possession of the same were obtained peaceably or otherwise, such
person shall be deemed guilty of forcible detainer, and
upon conviction thereof will be sentenced to pay a fine not
exceeding $500 or to undergo an imprisonment not exceeding one year or both or either at the discretion of the Court,
and to nake such restitution of the lands and tenements
unlawfully detained as aforesaid."
There seems, therefore, to be no longer any reason for
the exercise by the owner of a right which involves a
breach of the peace; and, consequently, cessanle ratione,
cessa ipsa et.
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